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Paradoxical Results in a Lobbying Model of Protection
https://shotoku.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/10
https://shotoku.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/103edafc43-98b3-4081-b8d4-789e8c1fa489
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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KJ00000702131.pdf (365.1 kB)
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Item type | [ELS]紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2017-03-17 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Paradoxical Results in a Lobbying Model of Protection | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題 | Lobbying, protection, tariff | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
著者 |
奥口, 孝二
× 奥口, 孝二 |
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著者所属(日) | ||||||
著者所属(日) | ||||||
抄録(英) | ||||||
内容記述 | Okuguchi and Yamazaki (1998) generalized Long and Soubeyran's lobbying model of protection. They also constructed a simple numerical example with the linear inverse demand and cost functions to illustrate a paradoxical result in which entry of a new domestic firm leads to an increase in the domestic incumbents' profits. This paper shows that the paradoxical result occurs even if cost functions are quadratic. Numerical examples in this paper, together with the one in Okuguchi and Yamazaki (1998), indicate that the paradoxical result is more likely if the number of domestic firms is small and if the number of foreign firms is large. JEL Classification Number: D43, D72, F13, L13 | |||||
書誌情報 |
Review of economics and information studies en : Review of economics and information studies 巻 1, 号 1/2, p. 27-35, 発行日 1999-07-01 |
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雑誌書誌ID | ||||||
収録物識別子 | AA11833171 | |||||
ISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子 | 13453998 |